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THE PEOPLE ex reI. DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC 
WORKS, Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 
MERCED COUNTY, Respondent; ROY L. RODONI 
et at, Real Parties in Interest. 
[la-Ie] Eminent Domain-Uses-Excess CQndemnation-To Avoid 
Excessive Damages: Mandamus.-Mandate must issue to com-
pel the trial court to proceed with that part of the Department 
of Public Works' suit seeking to condemn, for purposes of 
public "ecOnomy under Sts. & Hy. Code, § 104.1, 54 acres of 
a farmcr's land that would be left landlocked by an asso-
ciated condemnation, for highway purposes, of 0.65 acres of 
his land, where the record suggested that the entire parcel 
could probably be condemned for little more than the cost 
of taking the part needed for the highway and of paying 
damages for the remainder; but the excess condemnation 
must be denied unless justified by the avoidance of excessive 
severance or consequential damages. 
[2] Id.-Uses-Province to Determine.-It is for the Legislature 
to determine what shan be deemed a public use for the pur-
[1] Right to condemn property in excess of needs for a particu-
lar public purpose, note, 6 A.L.R.3d 297. See also Cal.J'ur.2d, 
Eminent Domain, §§ 8, 105; Am.Jur.2d, Eminent Domain, § 115. 
MeR. Dig. References:" [1] Eminent Domain, §§ 31.5, 184; 
Streets, § 16; Highways, § 43; [2] Eminent Domain, § 14; [3] 
Eminent Domain, §§ 2, 31.1; [4] Eminent Domain, §§ 31.3, 31.5; 
Streets, § 15; Highways, § 44; [5] Eminent Domain, § 31.5; Streets, 
§ 15; Highways, § 44; [6] Eminent Domain, § 31.1; Streets, § 15; 
Highways, § 44; [7] Eminent Domain, § 6; Constitutional Law, 
§ 85; [8] Eminent Domain, § 27; Streets, § 15; Highways, § 44; 
[9] Eminent Domain, § 14; Streets, § 15; Highways, § 55.5; [10] 
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poses of eminent domain, and its judgment is binding unless 
there is no possibility that the legislation may be for t.he 
welfare of the public. 
[3] Id.-Nature of Right: Excess Condemnation. - Eminent do-
main being an inherent attribute of sovereignty, constitu-
tional provisions relating thereto merely place limitations 011 
its exercise. Thus, Cal. Const., art. I, § 14%, while expressly 
limiting excess condemnations for protective purposes, in no 
way limits the power of the Legislature to authorize cxcess 
condemnations for other than protective purposes. 
[4] 1d.-Use5-Excess Condemnation-Remnants: To Avoid Ex-
cessive Da.mages.-Despite its broad statutory language, Sts. 
& Hy Code, § 104.1, may reasonably be interpreted to author-
ize only those excess condemnations that. are valid for public 
uses, namely, condemnation of remnants, 01' condcmnations 
to avoid a substantial risk of excessive seVC1·ance 01' conse-
quential damages. 
[6] Id.-Use5-Excess Condemnation-To Avoid Excessive Dam-
&ges.-Cal. Const., art. I, § 14, prccludes excess condcmnations 
under Sts. & Hy. Code, § 104.1, unless the economic benefit t<> 
the state is clear, and the mere avoidance of the cost of litigat-
ing damages claimed by the condemnee is not sufficient j nor 
does the state authorize condemnations for the sole purpOIlP 
of toking lands enhanced by the improvement in order to 
recoup thot increase in value, or for the sole purpose 01 
developing the area adjacent to the improvement for a proht. 
[6] Id.-Uses-Excess Condemnation.-Sts. & Hy. Code, § 104.1, 
providing for excess condemnation, is not an unconstitutional 
delegation of legislative power, since the statute contains ade-
quate standards for the guidance of the agency, and the con-
ditions in Sts. & Hy. Code, §§ 102, 103 and 104, themselves 
providing adequate standards governing the necessity of such 
condemnations, have first to be met. 
[7] Id.-Who May Exercise-Delegation.-The power of eminent 
domain may be delegated by the Legislature to an adminis-
trative body as long as the delegating statute establishes an 
ascertainable standard to guide the administrative agents. 
[8] Id. - Uses - Province to Determine Necessity. - Sts. & Hy. 
Code, § 103, by making conclusive the determination of the 
Highway Commission on the necessity of taking particular 
land, thus taking such issue outside the scope of judicial review, 
does not infringe the constitutional rights of thc condemnec. 
[9] Id.-Uses-Province to Determine What Is a Public Use.-
-------------_._-----------
[3] See Cal.Jur.2d, Eminent Domain, § 9; Am.Jur.2d, Eminent 
Domain, §§ ::!,7. 
I 
) 
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The issue of whether a taking of particular land under the 
Streets and Highways Code is for a public use is within the 
scope of judicial review. 
[10] Id. - Uses - Excess Condemnation - Evidence.-To raise an 
issue of improper excess taking in eminent domain, the con-
demnees must show that the condemner is guilty of fraud, 
bad faith or abuse of discretion in the sense that the condemner 
does not actually intend to use the property as it resolved to 
use it, or that the contemplated use is not a public one. 
PROCEEDING in mandamus to compel the Superior Court 
of Merced County to proceed with the condemnation of three 
instead of two parcels of real property owned by the real 
parties in interest. Writ granted. 
Harry S. Fenton, Holloway Jones, Jack M. Howard, Wil-
liam C. DeMartini, Charles E. Spencer, Jr., and William R. 
Edgar for Petitioner. 
Thomas C. Lynch, Attorney General, and Robert L. Berg-
man, Deputy Attorney General, as Amici Curiae on behalf of 
Petitioner. 
Linneman, Burgess, TeBes & Van Atta, L. M. Linneman 
and James E. Linneman for Real Parties in Interest. 
Fadem & Kanner and Gideon Kanner as Amici Curiae on 
behalf of Real Parties in Interest. 
TRAYNOR, C. J.-The Department of Public Works seeks 
to compel the trial court to proceed with the condemnation of 
three instead of two parcels of real property owned by the 
real parties in interest, Roy and Thelma Rodoni. 
The department built a freeway across a farm owned by the 
Rodonis. The farm consists of a southern rectangular parcel 
and a northern triangular parcel. The northeast corner of the 
former touches the southwest corner of the latter. The free-
way crosses the adjoining corners, taking a tip of each, which 
total .65 acres. As a result, the northern parcel of approxi-
mately 54 acres is landlocked. 
In addition to the .65 acres the freeway occupies, the 
department seeks to condemn the remaining landlocked 54 
acres pursuant to Streets and Highways Code section 104.1.1 
Its purpose is to protect the fisc by eliminating the risk that 
l' 'Whenever a part of a pareel of land is to be taken for State high-
way purposes and the remainder is to be left in such shape or condition 
as to be of little value to ita owner, or to give rise to claims or litigation 
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excessive severance damages to the landlocked parcel might be 
awarded for the taking of the corner that provided access to 
it. The department points out that if it is allowed to condemn 
the entire parcel the Rodonis will receive full value for their 
property, the risk of excessive severance damages will be elim-
inated, and ultimately it will be able to reduce the cost of the 
freeway by selling the part of the parcel not needed for 
freeway purposes. 
The Rodonis challenge the excess condemnation on the 
ground that taking property for such a purely economic pur-
pose violates article I, section 14 of the California Constitu-
tion2 because such taking is not for a "public use." They 
contend that excess condemnation must be limited to parcels 
that may properly be deemed remnants with respect to which 
the public interest in avoiding fragmented ownership comes 
into play. In their view, 54 acres, even if landlocked and of 
little value, cannot be deemed a remnant of .65 acres. They 
insist that the state pay severance damages for the landlocked 
parcel and allow them to retain it, even though severance 
damages may be equal to its full original market value. They 
also assert that the excess condemnation is prohibited by sec-
tion 14% of article I of the California ConstitutionS because 
it is not limited to land lying within 200 feet of the freeway. 
The trial court decided in favor of the Rodonis and ordered 
the complaint dismissed insofar as it seeks to condemn the 
landlocked parcel. It held that to allow the taking of any land 
eoneerning severance or other damage, the department may acquire the 
whole parcel and may Bell the remainder or may exchange the same for 
other property needed for State highway purposes." 
2California Constitution article I, section 14: "Private property shall 
not be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation having 
first been made to, or paid into court for, the owner .... " 
3" The State, or any of its cities or counties, may acquire by gift, pur-
ehase or condemnation, lands for establishing, laying out, widening, en-
larging, extending, and maintaining memorial grounds, streets, squares, 
parkways and reservations in and about and along and leading to any or 
all of the same, providing land so acquired shall be limited to parcels 
lying wholly or in part within a distance not to exceed one hundred fifty 
feet from the closest boundary of Buch public works or improvements; 
provided, that when parcels which lie only partially within said limit of 
one hundred fifty feet only such portions may be acquired which do not 
exceed two hundred feet from said closest boundary, and after the estab-
lishment, laying out and completion of such improvements, may convey 
any such real estate thUB acquired and not necessary for such improve-
ments, with reservations concerning the future use and occupation of such 
real estate so aR to protect sucp public works and improvements and their 
environs and to preserve the view, appearance, light, air and usefulness 
of Buch public works. 
"The Le'l'islllture may, by statute, prescribe procedure." 
i 
,.! 
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not physically necessary for the freeway would be a taking 
for other than the public use and that if section 104.1 were 
construed to allow such a taking it would be unconstitutional. 
The department then petitioned for a writ of mandate order-
ing the Merced County Superior Court to proceed with the 
trial of the original complaint or in the alternative for a writ 
of prohibition forbidding the court from proceeding in 
accordance with its order dismissing the complaint in part. 
(See Tide Water Assoc. Oil Co. v. Superior Court (1955) 43 
Cal.2d 815 [279 P.2d 35] ; Pinancial lrulem. Co. v. Superior 
Court (1955) 45 Ca1.2d 395, 399 [289 P.2d 233] ; People ex 
reI. Dept. Public Works v. Rodoni (1966) 243 Cal.App.2d 771 
[52 Cal.Rptr. 857].) 
[Ia] We hold that section 104.1 validly authorizes the 
trial court to procee.d with the action to condemn the 54 acres. 
We also hold, however, that it must refuse to condemn the 
property if it· finds that the taking is not justified to avoid 
excessive severance or consequential damages. The latter hold-
ing will assure that any excess tHking will be for a public use 
and preclude the department from using the power of excess 
condemnation as a weapon to seeure favorable settlements. 
[2] It is for the Legislature to determine what shall be 
deemed a public use for the purposes of eminent domain, and 
its judgment is binding unless there is no " 'possibility the 
legislation may be for the welfare of the public.'" (Linggi 
v. Garovotti (1955) 45 Cal.2d 20, 24 [286 P .2d 15], quoting 
University of Southern Cal. v. Robbins (1934) 1 Cal.App.2d 
523, 525-526 [37 P.2d 163] ; see also Housing Authority v. 
Dockweiler (1939) 14 Ca1.2d 437, 449-450 [94 P.2d 794] ; Lux 
v. Haggin (1886) 69 Cal. 255, 303-304 [4 P. 919, 10 P. 674] ; 
County of Los Angeles v. Anthony (1964) 224 Cal.App.2d 
103, 106 [36 Cal.Rptr. 308] ; Tuolumne Water Power Co. v. 
P"ederick (1910) 13 Cal.App. 498, 503 [llO P. 134].) "Any 
departure from this judicial restraint would result in courts 
deciding on what is and is not a governmental fUIlction and in 
tllCir invalidating legislation on the basis of their view on that 
question at the moment of decision, a practice which has 
proved impracticable in other fields." (United States ex reI. 
T.V.A. v. Welch (1946) 327 U.S. 546, 552 [90 L.Ed. 843, 848, 
66 S.Ct. 715].) 
Sections 104.1, 104.2, 104.3 and 104.6 of the Streets and 
Highways Code set forth the purposes for which the depart-
ment may acquire or condemn property not immediately 




Feb. 196B] PEOPLE EX REL. DEPT. PUB. WKS. v. 211 
SUPERIOR COURT 
[68 C.M 206; 65 CaLRptr. 342, 436 P.2d 3421 
purposes. In addition to the excess condemnation authorized 
by section 104.1, the department may condemn property for 
nonhighway public uses to be exchanged for property already 
devoted to such nonhighway uses when the department wishes 
to acquire the latter property for highway use. (§ 104.2) 4 It 
may condemn property adjacent to highways and other public 
works to be constructed by it and thereafter convey the adja-
cent property to private parties subject to restrictions 
protecting the highway or other public use. (§ 104.3.) Ii It 
may also acquire property for future needs and lease such 
property until it is needed. (§ 104.6.)6 None of these sections 
limits the others, and each •• is a distinct and separate author-
ization." (§ 104.7.) 
Section 104.3 is patterned after section 14% of article I of 
the California Constitution and, like that section, limits the 
property to be taken for protective purposes to property lying 
within 200 feet of the public work. It may be assumed without 
deciding that the constitutional provision compelled the statu-
tory limitation; that the reference to streets in section 14% 
includes state highways and that protective condemnations 
""Whenevel' property which is devoted to or held for some other public 
use for which the power of eminent domain might be exercised is to be 
taken for State highway purposes, the department may, with the consent 
of the person or agency in charge of such other public use, condemn, in 
the namc of the people of the State of California, real property to be 
exchanged with such person or agency for the real property so to be 
taken for State highway purposes. This section does not limit the authori. 
sation to the department to acquire, other than by condemnation, prop-
erty for such purposes." 
6" The department may condemn real property or any interest therein 
for reservations in and about and along and leading to any State high-
way or other public work or improvement constructed or to be constructed 
by the department and may, after the establishment, laying out and com-
pletion of such improvement, convey out [sic] any such real property or 
interest therein thus acquired and not necessary for such improvement 
with reservations concerning the future use and occupation of such rllal 
property or interest therein, so as to protect such public work and im-
provement and its environs and to preserve the view, appearance, light, 
air and usefulness of such public work; provided, that land so condemned 
under authority of this section shall be limited to parcels lying wholly 
. or in part within a dist.ance of not to exceed one hundred fifty feet from 
the closest boundary of such public work or improvement; provided that 
when parcels whieh lie only partially within such limit of Ol1e hundred 
fifty feet are taken, only SUell portions may be condemned which do not 
exceed two hundred feet from said closest boundary." 
6" The authority conferred by this code to acquire real property for 
state highway purposes includes authority to acquire for future needs. 
The department is authorized to lease any lands which are held for state 
highway purposes and are not presently needed therefor on sucb terms 
and conditions as the director may fix and to maintain and care for such 
property in order to secure rent therefrom .••. ' I 
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authorized by section 14lh are also limited by it. [3] Sec-
tion 14lh, however, does not limit the power of the Legisla-
ture to authorize excess condemnation for other than 
protective purposes. "Because eminent domain is an inherent 
attribute of sovereignty, constitutional provisions merely 
place limitations upon its exercise." (People ex rel Dept. of 
Public Works v. Ohevalier (1959) 52 Cal.2d 299, 3(» [340 
P.2d 598].) . 
Section 14lh was adopted in 1928 at a time when the va-
lidity of any excess condemnation was doubtful. It was not 
adopted to limit the power of eminent domain but to authorize 
condemnations that its sponsors believed would not be per-
mitted under then current rules of constitutional law. (1928 
Ballot Pamphlet, Argument for Proposed Senate Constitu-
tional Amend. No. 16.) Althougb it includes limitations on 
tbe condemnations it autborizes and to that extent limits the 
state's inherent power of eminent dom~in, it in no way limits 
those condemnations that it does not ~uthorize. Accordingly, 
since it only authorizes condemnations for protective pur-
poses, it does not restrict condemnations for other purposes. 
(People ex ret Dept. of Public Works v. Garden Grove Farms 
(1965) 231 CaI.App.2d 666, 668-673 [42 Cal.Rptr. 118]; see 
also State ex reI. Highway Oom. v. Ourtis (1949) 359 Mo. 402 
[222 S.W.2d 64] ; State ex reI. Thomson v. Giessel (1955) 271 
Wis. 15, 51-54 [72 N.W.2d 577, 595-597] ; State ex reI. Evjue 
v. Seybcrth (1960) 9Wis.2d 274, 279-281 [101 N.W.2d 118, 
121-122].) 
[4] In seetion 104.1 the Legislature has determined that 
excess condemnation is for a public use whenever remaining 
parcels are of little value or in such a condition as to give rise 
to claims or litigation concerning severance or other damages. 
Although the statutory language is broad, it may reasonably 
be interpreted to authorize only those excess condemnations 
that are for valid public uses; namely, condemnation of rem-
nants (see e.g., Kern Oounty IIigh School Disl. v. McDonald 
(1919) 180 Cal. 7, 16 [179 P. 180] ; People v. Thomas (1952) 
108 Ca1.App.2d 832, 836 [239 P.2d 914] ; In re Opinion of 
Justices (1910) 204 Mass. 616,619-620 [91 N.E. 578]; 2 Nich-
ols, Eminent Domain (3d ed. 1963) § 7.5122 [1], p. 717) or 
condemnations that avoid a substantial risk of excessive sev-
erance or consequential damages. On the record before us, the 
taking in the present case is justified on the latter ground. 
Although a parcel of 54 landlocked acres is not a physical 
) 
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remnant, it is a financial remnant: its value as a landlocked 
parcel is such that severance damages might equal its value. 
Remnant takings have long been considered proper. "The rea-
soning behind the 'remnant theory,' ... is that by limiting 
the acquisition to only such parts of the property as are 
needed by the particular improvement, fragments of lots 
would remain of such shape and size as to render them sep-
arately valueless, with the result that the city would be 
required to pay for the whole, although it took only a part, 
and with the further result that because of the lack of such 
value, the city would thereafter be deprived of collecting 
taxes on these remnants." (Annot., 6 A.L.R.3d 297, 317 
(1966) ; see also, 2 Nichols, Eminent Domain (3d ed. 1963) 
§ 75122 [1] p. 718.) There is no reason to restrict this theory 
to the taking of parcels negligible in size and to refuse to 
apply it to parcels negligible in value. 
[lb] In the present case the entire parcel can probably be 
condemned for little more than the cost of taking the part 
needed for the highway and paying damages for the remain-
der. It is sound economy for the state to take the entire parcel 
to minimize ultimate costs. ! 
Under these circumstances excess condemnation is constitu-
tional. "The cost of public projects is a relevant element in 
all of them, and the Government, just as anyone else, is not 
required to proceed oblivious to elements of costs. [Citations.] 
~ And when serious problems are created by its public projects, 
the Government is not barred from making a common sense 
adjustment in the interest of all the public." (United States 
ex reI. T. V.A. v. Welch, supra, 327 U.S. 546, 554 [90 L.Ed. 
843, 849] ; see also United States v. Agee (6th Cir. 1963) 322 
F.2d 139; Boston v. Talbot (1910) 206 Mass. 82, 89 [91 N.E. 
1014]; New Products Oorp. v. State Highway Oomr. (1958) 
352 Mich. 73, 86 [88 N.W.2d 528] ; Kern Oounty High School 
Dist. v. McDonald, supra, 180 Cal. 7, 16; People v. Thomas, 
supra,'108 Cal.App.2d 832,836.) 
[6] We need not decide in what specific cases other than 
those mentioned the statute authorizes excess condemnation. 
It should be emphasized, however, that the economic benefit to 
the state must be clear. The economic benefit of avoiding the 
cost of litigating damages is not sufficient. The statute does 
not authorize excess condemnation anytime the condemnee 
claims severance or consequential damages. To allow such 
condemnation would nullify the constitutional guarantee of 
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just compensation (Cal. Const., art. I, § 14) by permitting the 
state to threaten excess condemnation, not because it was eco-
nomically sound, but to coerce condemnees into accepting 
whatever value the state offered for the property actually 
taken or waiving severance or eonsequential damages to avoid 
an excess taking. 7 
[6] .AB so construed section 104.1 is not an unconstitu-
tional delegation of legislative power. Adequate standards 
appear in other provisions of the code. Section 102 of the 
Streets and Highways Code requires the Highway Commis-
sion, before authorizing condemnation by the department of 
any real estate for highway purposes, to make a determination 
that the "public interest and necessity require the acquisi-
tion" and. that "the real property or interest therein 
described in such resolution is necessary for the improve-
ment. "8 Section 103 makes the decision of the commission on 
the necessity of the improvement and of the taking of given 
property conclusive.s Section 104 provides a nonexclusive list 
of various purposes for which property is deemed necessa1'f.l0 
7Nor does section 104.1 authorize excess eondemnation for recoupment 
purposes, as the term is used in those esses that disfavor it. The statute 
does not authorize the state to eondemn for the sole purpose of taking 
lands enhanced by the improvement in order to reeoup that inerease in 
value or for the sole purpos!! of developing the area adjacent to the im-
provement for a profit. (See Annot., 6 A.L.R.Sd 297, 311-314.) The de-
partment's purpose is to avoid the windfall to the condemnee and the 
substantial loss to the state that results wIlen severance damages to a 
scvercd parcel are equal to its value. 
8Streets and Highways Code section 102: "In the. name of the people 
of the State of California, tlle department may condemn for State high-
way purposes, under the provisions of tlle Code of Civil Procedure relat-
ing to eminent domain, auy real property or interest therein which it is 
authorized to acquire. The department shall not commence any such 
proceeding in eminent domain unless the commission first adopts a resolu-
tion declaring that public interest and necessity require the acquisition, 
construction or completion by the State, acting through the department, 
of the improvement for which the resl property or interest tllerein is 
required and that the real property or interest therein described in such 
resolution is necessary for the improvement." 
0Streets and Highways Code section 103: "The resolution of the com-
mission shall be conclusive evidence: (a) Of the public necessity of such 
proposed public improvement. (b) That such real property or interest 
tllerein is necessary therefor. (c) That such proposed public improve-
ment is plamled or located in a manner which will be most compatible 
with the greatest public good and the least private injury." 
10Streets and Highways Code section 104: "The department may 
acquire, either in fee or in any lesser estate or interest, any real property 
which it considers necessary for State highway purposes. Real property 
for SUell purposes includes, but is not limited to, real property considered 
necessary for any of the following purposes: [Herein are listed such 
purposes as rights of way, offices, parks adjoining the higbway, land-
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Only after these other conditions are met does section 104.1 
come into play. 
[7] The power of eminent domain may be delegated by 
the Legislature to administrative bodies. (Holloway v. Purcell 
(1950) 35 Ca1.2d 220, 231 [217 P.2d 665].) Discretion canllot 
be absolute, but "if the delegating statute establishes an 
ascertainable standard to guide the administrative agents no 
objection can properly be made to it." (Wotton v. Bush 
(1953) 41 Cal.2d 460, 468 [261 P.2d 256].) In the Holloway 
case we held that standards found in Streets and Highways 
Code section 100.2 governing the discretion of the State High-
way Commission in fixing the location of freeways were suffi-
ciently definite. Section 100.2 authorizes the commission to 
approve the location of freeways whenever that location "in 
its opinion will best subserve the public interest." The stan-
dards found in section 104.1 are no less definite, and are 
similarly constitutional. 
[8] The question remains of the scope of review of the 
department's decision to condemn excess property. Section 
103 of the Streets and Highways Code makes the determina-
tion of the Highway Commission conclusive on the necessity 
of taking particular land. If thc taking is for a public use and 
just compensation is paid, no constitutional rights of the con-
demnee are infringed by making the issue of necessity 
nonjusticiable. (People ex reI. Dept. of Public lV orks v. Oheva-
lier, supra, 52 Cal.2d 299; see also Rindge 00. v. Oounty of 
Los Angeles (1923) 262 U.S. 700, 708-710 [67 L.Ed. 1186, 
1193-1194,43 S.Ct. 689].) 
[9] The issue of whether a taking is for a public use, 
however, is justiciable. (People ex reI. Dept. of Public 1V O1'ks 
v. Ohevalier, supra, 52 Cal.2d 299.) The distinction between 
the scope of review of the questions of public use and neces-
sity was properly recognized in People ex reI. Dept. of Public 
Works v. Lagiss (1963) 223 Cal.App.2d 23, 39 [35 Ca1.Rptr. 
554] : "The necessity for the construction of a highway at the 
place designated and in the manner determined by the Com-
mission, together with the amount of land required therefor, 
are matters which were conclusively established by the adop-
tion of the resolution [of necessity]. The question as to 
whether the land was to be devoted to a public use, however, 
. as distinguished from private purposes or to accomplish some 
purpose which is not public in character, became a proper 
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issue for the judicial determination of the court." [10] To 
raise an issue of improper excess taking, condemnees must 
show that the condemner is guilty of "fraud, bad faith, or 
abuse of discretion in the sense that the condemner does not 
actually intend to use the property as it resolved to use it" 
(People ex reI. Dept. of Public Works v. Chevalier, supra, 52 
Ca1.2d 299, 304), or that the contemplated use is not a public 
one (see also People ex reI. Dept. of Public Works v. Lagiss, 
supra, 223 Cal.App.2d 23, 35-44; Yeshiva Torath Emeth 
Academy v. University of Southern Cal. (1962) 208 Cal.App. 
2d 618, 619-620 [25 CaI.Rptr. 422] ; County of San Mateo v. 
Bartole (1960) 184 Ca1.App.2d 422, 430-434 [7 Cal.Rptr. 
569] ; People ex reI. Dept. of Public Works v. Nahabedian 
(1959) 171 Cal.App.2d 302, 306-309 [340 P.2d 1053]). 
[1c] WheR, as in this case, the property is not needed for 
the physical construction of the public improvement, the ques-
tion of public use turns on a determination of whether the 
taking is justified t(l avoid excessive severance or consequen-
tial damages. Accordingly, if the court determines that the 
excess condemnation is not so justified, it must find that it is 
not for a public use. 
Let a writ of mandate issue ordering the trial court to 
proceed with the trial of the case under the original complaint 
in accordance with the views expressed herein. 
McComb, J., Tobriner, J., Burke, J., and Sullivan, J., con-
curred. 
MOSK, J.-I dissent. 
Whenever an illustration of the voracious appetite of 
acquisitive government is desired, the action of the public 
agency here will serve well as Exhibit A: 
To state the facts is to decide the case. Needing slightly 
more than a half acre for a public use (65/100 of an acre, to 
be precise), this governmental department seeks to take 54.03 
acres of private property which it does not need and cannot 
use. Its avowed purpose is to speculate on resale to a private 
purchaser. 
No further discussion should be required to decide that the 
proposed condemnation is improper. Yet the agency advances 
a strange latter-day economics theory that taking more costs 
less, and cites as authority Streets and Highways Code section 
104.1. If the section purports to grant any such power to the 
state, it is clearly in conflict with article I, section 14, of. the 
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California Constitution, which provides that "Private prop-
erty shall not be taken or damaged for p'llblic use without just 
compensation having first been made to, or paid into court 
for, the owner .... " (Italics added.) Clearly no public use 
is involved in the taking of the 54 acres, for the land is 
admittedly more than 83 times in excess of that actually 
required for highway purposes. 
Section 104.1, upon which the state relies, provides that 
"Wherever a part of a parcel of land is to be taken for state 
highway purposes and the remainder is to be left in such 
shape or condition as to be of little value to its owner, or to 
give rise to claims or litigation concerning severance or other 
damage, the department may acquire the whole parcel and 
may sell the remainder or may exchange the same for other 
property needed for state highway purposes." 
A statute must be given a reasonable interpretation. (Peo-
ple v. Murata (1960) 55 Ca1.2d 1, 7 [9 Cal.Rptr. 601, 357 P.2d 
833], and cases cited.) It seems clear that when the Legisla-
ture adopted the foregoing section referring to ' 'the 
remainder" after a taking, it contemplated situations in 
which an insignificant remnant might remain. As a leading 
authority explains, it is "not an uncommon provision in the 
statutes relating to the laying out and widening of highways 
in force in the cities in which such conditions exist that, when 
part of a parcel of land is taken and the remainder is left in 
such condition or in such a shape as to be of little value to its 
owner, the city may take the whole and use or sell what it 
does not need for the highway, it being felt that it will be less 
expensive in the end for the city to take and pay for the 
whole of such lots and either to devote the remnants to muni-
cipal purposes, or, by consolidating contiguous remnants, sell 
them for a fair price, than to engage in protracted litigation 
over the question of damages to the remaining land with each 
owner. If the owner consents or if the statute provides merely 
that he may surrender the whole tract if he chooses, no consti-
tutional objections can arise. for such a proceeding doubtless 
tends to save the public money; but, if the owner insists upon 
keeping what is left of his land, grave constitutional difficul-
ties would be encountered if it was attempted to compel him 
to part with it. Construing such a statute as limited in its 
application to trifting and almost negligible remnants which 
would be unsuitable for private use after the part actually 
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needcd for public usc had been appropriated, it would prob-
ably be sustainec1 in some jurisdictions at least as authorizing 
a taking for a purpose rcasonilbly incidental to the laying out 
of public ways. Howcver, if thc proposed taking savored at all 
of a municipal land spccmlation, no court would hesitate to 
hold it unconstitutional." (Italics added; footnotes omitted.) 
(2 Nichols on Emincnt Domain (3d ed. 1963) § 7.5122(1), pp. 
718-719.) . 
Such a "trifling and almost negligiblc remnant" could 
result, for example, from a talcing of 54 acres leaving an 
irregular half-acre residue; but to reverse that ratio, and 
deem 54 acres to be the remainder of a half acre, is truly a 
case of the tail wagging tIle dog. 
The majority concede that tIle parcel of 54 acres here is not 
a physical remnant. That should end the lawsuit. But then 
they advance. a novel theory, neither urged by the parties nor 
supported by authority, that "remnant" refers not only to 
geography but also to value. 
If so, an inevitable query follows: "Value to whom'" Sec-
tion 104.1 malces it crystal clear that the criterion is not value 
to thc state, as the majority erroncously assume; to justify 
taking, the remainder must be "of little value to its owner." 
By his resistance the owner here demonstrates that to him 
there is more than "little value" in the 54 acres: Even if the 
owncr did not so contend, however, tIle court may take judi-
cial notice that in the context of California's current 
popUlation explosion, no 54-acre parcel in the state is without 
ascendant value. In the case at bench the purported "little 
value" of the 54 acres is attributed to the resultant land-
locked condition of the property. Without deciding whether 
any property need remain totany inaceessible, property in a 
landlocked condition may readily become marketably valuable 
merely by acquisition of an easement for access, or by annexa-
tion of or to adjacent property. 
The second clause of section 104.1 suggests that the excess 
taking must provide a benefit to the state. Without pursuing 
the dubious constitutional aspect of that overly broad provi-
sion, in this instance its application is fallacious: so long as 
just compensation for the taking must be paid, by condemn-
ing over 83 times more property than it needs, a fortiori the 
state is paying morc than it must necessarily pay. . 
The theory of the agency is that by taking the land not 
required for public use, assertedly of little value, it will 
) 
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recoup by resale.1 But there is no repeal of the basic laws of 
the marketplace when the state becomes a vendor. If the land 
is truly of little value, the state will obtain little return by 
way of sale. Thus, there is no significant benefit to the state, 
as required by the statute, in depriving the owner of his prop-
erty. 
Nevertheless, the majority insist that "The entire parcel 
can probably be condemned for little more than the cost of 
taking the part needed for the highway and paying damages 
for the remainder. It is sound economy for the state to take 
the entire parcel to minimize ultimate costs," and again 
later, the majority stress "that the economic benefit to the 
state must be clear." While as indicated above, I doubt there 
is clear economic benefit to the .state from this excessive tak-
ing, fundamentally I find the concept of economy, rather than 
public use or public purpose,2 to be a unique and unsupport-
able rationalization to justify the seizure of an individual's 
private property.s The state relies heavily on United States ex 
reI. T.V.A. v. Welch (1945) 327 U.S. 546 [90 L.Ed. 843, 66 
S.Ct. 715], in which 6,000 acres beyond that needed for dam 
purposes were taken, and the court there referred to "a com-
mon sense adjustment." Factually, however, the case offers 
no guidance to us, for the excess land was not resold but was 
adapted to public recreational purposes, authority for which 
was specifically provided in the T.V.A. act. 
What constitutes a public use is basically a question of fact. 
In Linggi v. Garovotti (1955) 45 Ca1.2d 20,24 [286 P.2d 15], 
lThe recoupment theory has been roundly condemned in Nichola (2 
Nichola on Eminent Domain (3d ed. 1963) 17.5122(3), p. 720): "al-
though sanctioned in countries in which the power of the legislature is 
not restricted by a written constitution," recoupment, which "involves 
the taking of the property of one person and the sale of it to another for 
his own private use," has not been approved in American jurisdictions. 
(See also In re Opinion of JUStice8 (1910) 204 Mass. 607 [91 N.E. 405, 
27 L.R.A. N.S. 483]; Atwood v. Willacy County Nov. Dist. (Tex. Civ. 
App. 1954) 271 S.W.2d 137, 141.) 
2As indicated in Redevelopment Agency v. Hayes (1954) 122 Cal. 
App.2d 777, 789 [266 P.2d 105], "the more modem courts have enlarged 
the traditional definition of public use to include 'public purpose.' " 
Thus slum clearance was deemed a public purpose, even though after the 
taking and demolition of the slums, redevelopment was to be undertaken 
by private industry. 
SIn Cincinnati v. Vester (6th Cir. 1929) 33 F.2d 242, 245, an Ohio 
statute authorizing excess condemnation was criticized: "If it means 
••• that the pl'operty may be taken for the purpose of selling it at a 
profit and paying for the improvement, it is clearly invalid ...• [I)t 
violates the due process clause of the Constitution." (Aft'd. in 281 U.S. 
439, with the United States Supreme Court refraining from an opinion 
on any subject other than compliance with the statute.) 
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this court approved the rule: "whether, in any individual 
case, the use is a public use must be determined by the judi-
ciary from the facts and circumstances of that case." Here 
the trial court, after hearing evidence and reviewing the facts, 
found that the proposed a<'quisition was not related to any 
public use and was therefore constitutionally impermissible. 
The state does not complain of an abuse of discretion, or, 
indeed, of erroneous conclusions by the trial court; it merely 
maintains that no court has the power to review its reliance 
on section 104.1. To the contrary, however, this court held in 
People v. Chevalier (1959) 52 Ca1.2d 299, 304 [340 P.2d 598], 
that the issue of public use is justiciable in eminent domain 
proceedings. 
Section 104.1, as interpreted by the state, would lack any 
definitive standards and thus clearly do violence to the consti-
tutional requirement of due process. The trial court noted in 
its memorandum opinion that the state's right-of-way agent, 
as a witness, gave as his opinion under the provisions of sec-
tion 104.1 "the state would hllve a right to take as much as 
one thousand acres of private property, even though it was 
not for a public use." If a thousand acres, why not 6,000 
acres as in Welch, or 10,000 or 100,000 acres' If there is any 
limitation whatever on the amount of land the state may take, 
without intent to devote it to a public use, neither section 
104.1 nor the majority opinion snggests the boundaries. Gov-
ernment's . cavalier treatment of private property rights, 
abjectly approved by the majority, evokes apprehension that 
Big Brother may have arrived 16 years before 1984. 
Amici curiae have complained that the power of the 
Department of Public Works to condemn any excess property 
without HmJtation becomes a potent weapon to be used against 
prospective condemnees who refuse to sell at the price offered 
by the department. Right-of-way agents, it is indicated, 
demand acquiescence in sale of the desired part of the land at 
the proffered price with a threat of a punitive taking of all 
the owner's property. This could be disregarded as a fanciful 
fear were it not for the state agency's petition for writ of 
mandate, which candidly admits that denial of the right of 
excess condemnation "will also have important and substan-
tial side effects upon the heretofore successful policy of 
petitioner in negotiating the settlement of land acquisitions." 
We cannot be oblivious to the "tremendous power in govern-
ment" and the need for "a growing sensitivity to the 
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ment," as Justice Tobriner has written. (Tobriner, Indi-
vidual R1'ghts in an Industrialized Society (1968) 54 A.B.A.J. 
21,22.) 
The majority finally propose this doctrine: "the question of 
public use turns on a determination of whether the taking is 
justified to avoid excessive severance or consequential dam-
ages. " This concept is completely wrong. It ignores the key 
word: use. 
'Condemnation is not a necessary antidote for' excessive 
damages, since the law has always been clear that excessive 
damages are indefensible in any case and under all circum-
stances, and a ready remedy by trial and appellate courts is 
available. (Code Civ. Proc., § 657, subds. 5 and 6; Koyer v. 
McComber (1938) 12 Cal.2d 175, 182 [82 P.2d 941] [new trial 
granted] ; Barrett v. Southern Pac. Co. (1929) 207 Cal. 154, 
166 [277 P. 481] [reversal on appeal]; Maede v. Oakland 
High School Dist. (1931) 212 Cal. 419, 425 [298 P. 987] 
[reduction on appeal] ; 2 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (7th 
ed. 1960) Torts, § 443, pp. 1636-1637.} Indeed, that the trial 
judge was well aware of his responsibility is indicated by his 
written memorandum, noting that if excessive severance dam-
ages were awarded, the court would "be remiss in its duty :if 
it did not reduce whatever amount was excessive." Once the 
word "excessive" is eliminated from the majority's rule, we 
come to the nub of the problem: the state agency proposes no 
use of the property whatever, but merely seeks to avoid pay-
ing any severance or consequential damages even though the 
law recognizes such damages as being assessable in appro-
priate cases. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1248, subd. 2; 3 Witkin, 
Summary of Cal. Law (7th ed. 1960) Constitutional Law, 
§ 236, p. 2046.) 
I would substitute for the majority's rule the following: 
the question of public use or purpose turns on a factual deter-
mination of what the public agency proposes to do with the 
property after acquisition. 
Employing that test, the trial court found as a fact that the 
property was not being taken for a public use. Since land 
speculation is clearly not a public use, the trial court was 
correct. I would therefore affirm the order. 
. Peters, J;, concurred. 
The petition of the real parties in interest for a rehearing 
was denied February 28, 1968. Peters, J., and Mosk, J., were 
of the opinion that the petition should be granted. 
